The HORRORS of Ayatollah Khomeinis Execution Methods
When Ayatollah Khomeini took power, many Iranians believed a new era of justice had begun. But what followed instead was a decade where executions became one of the most powerful tools of the state.
From rooftop firing squads, to public crane hangings, to secret mass executions, the system moved fast and showed little mercy.
When Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini landed in Tehran on February 1, 1979, after nearly fifteen years in exile, the country was already on the edge. The Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, had left Iran on January 16.
His government was collapsing piece by piece. Army units were confused. Ministers were resigning. Protesters were still flooding the streets.
Within ten days of Khomeini’s return, the monarchy was effectively finished. On February 11, 1979, revolutionary forces took control of key military bases, radio stations, and government buildings in Tehran.
The Islamic Republic had not yet been officially declared. But real power was already shifting into the hands of clerics and revolutionary committees loyal to Khomeini.
Revolutionary Courts were formed almost immediately. They operated outside the old legal system. Their ultimate goal was swift punishment.
Executions began just days after the revolution’s victory. On the night of February 15, 1979, four high-ranking military officials from the Shah’s regime were brought to the roof of the Refah School in Tehran. This building had become a temporary revolutionary headquarters.
Their names were General Mehdi Rahimi, who had served as Tehran’s military governor during the final protests; General Reza Naji, the military governor of Isfahan; General Manouchehr Khosrodad, commander of the Air Force; and General Nematollah Nassiri, the former head of SAVAK, the Shah’s feared intelligence service.
Their trials had taken place earlier that same day. They were accused of ordering the killing of protesters and supporting repression under the Shah.
The proceedings lasted only a few hours. There were no defense attorneys present to argue their case. There was no jury. There was no appeal process. The verdicts were announced quickly.
That same night, they were executed by firing squad. The method was simple and harsh. The men were lined up against a wall. Some accounts say they were blindfolded.
Armed guards stood a short distance away. When the order was given, the shots rang out at close range. Within minutes, it was over. Their bodies were removed shortly after.
Photographs and video footage of the executions were taken and circulated. Iranian state media did not hide what had happened. In fact, the images were broadcast.
The new leadership wanted people to see it. They wanted everyone to understand that the revolution was final.
As February turned into March 1979, executions increased in number and spread beyond top generals. The Revolutionary Courts began targeting former ministers, police officials, intelligence officers, and people accused of working closely with the Shah’s government.
Overseeing many of these trials was a cleric named Sadegh Khalkhali. He had been appointed directly by Khomeini as a Sharia judge.
Khalkhali quickly became one of the most powerful figures in the new judicial system. He believed the revolution had to protect itself at all costs.
Trials under his authority were extremely fast. Some lasted less than half an hour. Defendants were often brought in, read the charges, asked a few questions, and then sentenced.
The charges themselves were broad and carried heavy weight under Islamic law. “Corruption on earth” was one of the most common accusations. Another was “waging war against God.”
These phrases covered a wide range of actions, from ordering violence against protesters to simply holding a high position in the previous government. Under the new system, these charges often meant automatic execution.
By April 1979, more than one hundred officials linked to the Shah’s regime had been executed. Many were shot by firing squad inside prison compounds or military facilities. But another method began appearing more frequently as the weeks passed: hanging.
Hangings were carried out both inside prisons and increasingly in public spaces. Public executions were meant to be seen. They were sometimes announced in advance.
Crowds gathered in city squares. Families stood among strangers. The condemned were brought out with their hands tied behind their backs.
Construction cranes were often used instead of traditional gallows. A rope was secured around the person’s neck and attached to the crane hook.
When the machine lifted, the body slowly rose off the ground. Unlike a long-drop hanging designed to break the neck instantly, this method often caused death by strangulation. It could take several minutes.
The bodies sometimes remained suspended for hours as a warning.
These public hangings changed the atmosphere in cities like Tehran, Qom, and Tabriz. They were no longer just legal punishments. They were demonstrations of power. The state was showing that it controlled life and death.
Under Khalkhali’s authority, executions continued at a rapid pace through the spring and summer of 1979. His approach became so closely tied to these swift death sentences that he earned the nickname the Hanging Judge.
By this point, fear had become part of daily life. People understood that a trial could happen quickly and end the same day. The early firing squads had shocked the country. The public hangings made that shock permanent.
By 1980, the Islamic Republic was in total control. The new constitution had been approved in December 1979. Ruhollah Khomeini was officially the Supreme Leader.
Revolutionary Courts were no longer temporary tools of chaos. They were now part of the system, operating in Tehran and in major cities across the country.
At the same time, Iran was entering another crisis. In September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran. The Iran-Iraq War had begun.
The country was under military pressure from the outside, and the leadership became even less tolerant of opposition on the inside.
Execution methods became more regular and organized. Firing squads were still used, especially for former officers, intelligence figures, and people accused of spying.
But hanging quickly became the main method. It was easier to carry out repeatedly. It required fewer personnel. It became routine.
Then came June 1981.
On June 20, 1981, massive protests broke out in Tehran after the government removed President Abolhassan Banisadr from office. The main force behind the street protests was the Mujahedin-e Khalq, also known as the MEK.
The government labeled them armed enemies of the state.
Within days, bombings shook Tehran, including a major explosion on June 28 at the headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party. That blast killed more than seventy officials, including Chief Justice Mohammad Beheshti.
The response was immediate and brutal. Security forces launched a nationwide crackdown.
Thousands of suspected MEK members and sympathizers were arrested in Tehran, Isfahan, Mashhad, Shiraz, and other cities. Many were young. Some were students barely in their twenties. Others were activists, writers, or people accused of distributing pamphlets.
Executions followed quickly. Trials often lasted only a few minutes. Prisoners were brought before Revolutionary Court judges, asked about their political affiliation, and sentenced.
There were usually no defense lawyers present. There was no meaningful appeal process. In many cases, prisoners were moved directly from interrogation rooms to execution areas.
Inside Evin Prison in Tehran, mass hangings became common during the summer and fall of 1981. Prisoners were taken in groups down corridors. Their hands were tied behind their backs. Some were blindfolded.
They were lined up and hanged in clusters to speed up the process. Survivors who were later released described seeing multiple bodies hanging side by side in prison halls.
Human rights organizations later estimated that in 1981 alone, more than two thousand people were executed in Iran. Most of them were accused of links to opposition groups like the MEK.
Some estimates placed the number even higher. The exact total remains disputed, but the scale was undeniable.
By the end of 1981, the system was highly structured. Arrest, short interrogation, brief trial, execution. The process could move from accusation to death within days.
Throughout the early 1980s, public crane hangings again became one of the most recognizable forms of execution in Iran. The setup was simple but powerful.
A construction crane would be driven into the center of the square. Crowds gathered, sometimes after official announcements on local radio.
The condemned person was brought out, often surrounded by Revolutionary Guards. Their hands were tied. A rope was placed around their neck and attached to the crane hook.
When the crane operator lifted the arm, the body rose slowly into the air. It could take several minutes. Medical teams were sometimes present to confirm death, but there was no attempt to make the process quick or painless.
The charges behind these public hangings varied. Some were political prisoners accused of belonging to opposition groups. There were also executions for crimes labeled as moral offenses under Islamic law.
Announcements were sometimes made in advance to ensure attendance. Schools and workplaces were not officially ordered to attend, but the events were widely known. Word spread quickly in neighborhoods.
Footage of some public executions was filmed and circulated domestically. State media did not always hide these events. In fact, showing them reinforced the message that the Islamic Republic would act decisively against anyone it labeled an enemy.
By the mid-1980s, Iran had one of the highest execution rates in the world compared to its population size. International human rights groups repeatedly raised concerns about rapid trials, lack of legal representation, and the public nature of many executions.
But even these visible displays of power were not the peak.
In 1988, something happened inside prison walls that would surpass the scale and secrecy of everything that came before.
By the summer that year, the Iran-Iraq War had dragged on for nearly eight years. Hundreds of thousands were dead. Cities had been bombed. The country was exhausted.
On July 20, 1988, Iran accepted United Nations Resolution 598 and agreed to a ceasefire with Iraq. For many Iranians, it felt like the end of a long nightmare.
But, in late July 1988, under the authority of Ruhollah Khomeini, a secret directive was issued. The order focused on political prisoners who were already serving sentences, especially those connected to the MEK.
Just days earlier, the MEK had launched a cross-border attack from Iraq into western Iran, known as Operation Forough Javidan. The Iranian government crushed it within days. The failed attack deeply angered the leadership in Tehran.
Shortly after, prison officials across the country were instructed to re-examine certain inmates. These were not new arrests. Many of these prisoners had been in jail for years. Some had already finished their original sentences but were still being held.
Inside major prisons such as Evin in Tehran and Gohardasht Prison in Karaj, special panels were formed. Later, survivors would call them Death Commissions.
In Tehran, the panel included figures such as Hossein-Ali Nayyeri, a Sharia judge; Morteza Eshraghi, the Tehran prosecutor; and Mostafa Pourmohammadi, a representative from the Intelligence Ministry. Their job was to question prisoners and decide their fate.
Prisoners were brought in one by one. The questioning was short. Sometimes it lasted only a few minutes.
If a prisoner refused to renounce their political affiliation or was seen as loyal to the MEK, the decision was immediate. They were sent out of the room and directed toward another section of the prison. Many did not understand at first what was happening.
Most were hanged.
The executions were carried out inside prison halls, storage rooms, or makeshift execution areas. Groups of prisoners were brought in batches. Ropes were prepared in advance.
The process moved quickly. There were no public announcements. No media coverage. No official statements.
Families were not informed beforehand. In many cases, they only learned weeks or months later that their relatives had been executed. Some were told to collect personal belongings from prison offices. They were warned not to hold public mourning ceremonies.
The exact number of those executed between July and September 1988 is still debated. Human rights organizations estimate that between four thousand and five thousand political prisoners were killed in those months.
Some opposition sources claim even higher numbers. What is clear is that the majority were linked to the MEK, but leftist groups such as the Tudeh Party and other Marxist organizations were also targeted in a second wave of executions later that summer.
Bodies were not returned to families. Many were buried in mass graves. One known burial site is Khavaran cemetery, located on the outskirts of Tehran.
Families later reported that they were never officially told where their loved ones were buried. Over the years, some alleged mass grave sites were disturbed or altered, adding more pain and uncertainty.
Unlike the public hangings of the early 1980s, this operation was carried out in silence. There were no cranes in city squares. No crowds. No cameras. The secrecy was part of the design.
This was not random violence. It was organized. Prison records were reviewed. Names were called systematically. Decisions were made in structured panels. The machinery of the state focused on prisoners who were already behind bars and under full control.
These prison executions became the most concentrated wave of executions during Khomeini’s rule. It happened in just a few months. Thousands were killed without new trials in any real sense, without public scrutiny, and without acknowledgment at the time.
For years, little was said openly inside Iran about what happened that summer. But the memory did not disappear.
While political prisoners were being executed, another wave of executions was happening under a different label.
During the 1980s, Iran was facing a serious narcotics problem. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, opium and heroin production across the border increased sharply.
Iran sits directly on one of the main trafficking routes from Afghanistan to Europe. Smuggling networks moved large quantities of drugs across Iran’s eastern borders, especially through Sistan and Baluchestan Province.
The leadership in Tehran saw this as both a criminal and moral threat. Under the authority of Ruhollah Khomeini, strict anti-narcotics laws were introduced in the early 1980s.
These laws imposed the death penalty for possession or trafficking of certain amounts of heroin, morphine, or opium. The quantities required for a death sentence were not always large by international standards. Repeat offenses could also lead to execution.
Revolutionary Courts handled many of these drug cases. The process often moved quickly. A suspect would be arrested, interrogated, and brought before a judge.
Trials were usually short. There was limited access to defense lawyers. Appeals were either restricted or did not significantly delay execution.
Most of these sentences were carried out by hanging. Some took place inside prisons. Others were carried out in public squares, using cranes in the same way political executions had been done earlier.
The government presented these executions as necessary to protect society from addiction and organized crime.
By the mid to late 1980s, hundreds of people were being executed each year for drug-related offenses. International human rights organizations repeatedly reported that Iran’s overall execution rate was among the highest in the world compared to its population size.
Exact annual numbers were hard to confirm, but the scale was large enough to draw global attention.
The methods had by now become standardized. In 1979, rooftop firing squads had marked the revolution’s early days. In the early 1980s, public crane hangings became common.
By 1988, organized mass hangings inside prison halls showed how structured the system had become. Whether the charge was political opposition or narcotics trafficking, the machinery of capital punishment was firmly in place.
Each method served a different purpose. Firing squads signaled revolutionary justice. Public hangings created fear in open view. Prison executions removed people quietly and efficiently.
Together, they formed a system that relied heavily on the death penalty as a tool of control and enforcement.
On June 3, 1989, Ruhollah Khomeini died at the age of eighty-six after years of declining health. Millions attended his funeral in Tehran.
For supporters, he was the leader who overthrew a monarchy and reshaped Iran. For others, his decade in power was marked by repression and large-scale executions.
The executions were not limited to one moment or one crisis. They stretched across the entire decade.
By the time Khomeini died in 1989, the Islamic Republic had built a justice system where capital punishment was a central feature. It had been used against former regime officials, opposition activists, alleged spies, and drug offenders. It had been displayed publicly and carried out in silence.
The impact of that decade did not disappear with his death. The scale of executions left a lasting mark on Iran’s political culture and on thousands of families who lost relatives without warning, without public trials, and without clear burial sites.
From the first gunshots fired in February 1979 to the hidden hangings of 1988, the system was designed to remove threats quickly and decisively.
The horror was not only in the act itself. It was in the speed of it. The certainty of it. And the tragic fact that so many never had a real chance to defend themselves before the rope tightened or the shots were fired.
